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Abstract We compare two aspects of meaning, namely the presupposition of stop in
the scope of negation (John didn’t stop going to the movies on Wednesday., ↪→ John
used to go to the movies before Wednesday.) and scalar implicatures associated with
strong scalar items under negation (John didn’t always go to the movie last week. ↪→
John sometimes went to the movies last week.) (‘Indirect Scalar Implicatures’ (ISIs)
Chierchia, 2004). Our results replicate the finding by Chemla and Bott (2013) that
global presupposition interpretations are faster with a different methodology that
avoids a potential confound of response bias. More surprisingly, ISIs are found to
pattern with presuppositions in that responses reflecting an interpretation without an
inference (corresponding to a ‘literal’ interpretation) are slower than ones based on
the relevant inference, contrary to what has been found for direct scalar implicatures.
These results are puzzling from the traditional perspective that ISIs are generated in
the same way as direct implicatures. We explore two possible interpretations: first,
strong scalar terms could receive a presuppositional analysis as well and presuppose
that their domain is non-empty. Alternatively, we could group stop and ISIs together
from another angle and see them as obligatory scalar implicatures, in contrast to the
non-obligatory direct ones.
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1 Introduction
As participants of conversations, we draw a variety of inferences from the sentences
we hear. Some of these inferences are thought to be associated directly with the
linguistic forms uttered, others instead are considered to go beyond the basic or
literal meanings of the sentences they arise from. For instance, from a sentence like
(1a) we typically conclude that the information in (1b) is true. Analogously, from a
sentence like (2a) we tend to infer that John used to show up late for class, (2b).
(1) a. John sometimes went to the movies.
b. ↪→John didn’t always go
(2) a. John didn’t stop showing up late for class.
b. ↪→John used to show up late for class
The type of inference in (1b) is generally called a ‘scalar implicature’, while that
in (2b) is a instance of a ‘presupposition.’1 While it is controversial what the place of
these inferences should be with respect to the semantics/pragmatics divide, they are
not considered to be part of the ‘literal’ truth-conditional meaning of (1a) and (2a).
The main reason for this is that while these inferences are typically drawn, there are
cases in which they appear to be absent, as we will see below.2 Moreover, how these
inferences should be derived is far from being a settled matter in the literature. On
the contrary, many theories have been proposed, some of which very different from
each other. What is most relevant for us in connection to (1b) and (2b), however, is
that the majority of these theories agree that these inferences are different in kind.3
In the psycholinguistic literature, inferences such as (1a) have been extensively
studied, in particular from the perspective of how these inferences are processed
(Bott and Noveck 2004; Bott et al. 2012; Breheny et al. 2006; Huang and Snedeker
2009, Chemla and Bott under review). More recently, work has also been conducted
on presuppositions (Chemla and Bott 2013; Schwarz 2007; Schwarz and Tiemann
2012, 2013). One of the main findings of these studies on the processing of infer-
ences exemplified in (1b) and (2b) is that they appear to have very different pro-
cessing profiles - a difference that nicely reflects the theoretical distinction stan-
dardly posited in the literature. In the case of scalar implicatures such as (1a), there
is evidence that they are associated with a processing cost when compared to the
corresponding literal meanings. In response times studies, in particular, the delay
1 The literatures on both topics are vast, so let us just point to recent overviews for further back-
ground reading: for scalar implicatures, see Chierchia et al. 2012 and Geurts 2010 and references
therein; for presuppositions, see Beaver and Geurts 2012 and references therein.
2 Notice that, strictly speaking, this fact alone does not imply that these inferences could not be
part of the literal meaning of one of the possible interpretations of (1a) and (2a), if the latter are
considered ambiguous. In fact, some accounts of scalar implicatures and presuppositions do posit
some form of ambiguity to account for the optionality just mentioned. As the issue is not relevant
for our discussion, we will ignore it here. See Chierchia et al. 2012 for discussion.
3 There are some exceptions, in particular Chemla 2009b and Romoli 2012, Romoli (to appear).
We will come back to these alternative approaches in the discussion section below.
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associated with evaluating a sentence in a situation consistent with its scalar impli-
cature has been consistently found to be longer than that of a situation inconsistent
with the scalar implicature (but consistent with the sentence’s literal meaning) (Bott
and Noveck 2004 and much subsequent work). Similar results have been found
with other methodologies (Breheny et al. 2006; Huang and Snedeker 2009; but see
Grodner et al. 2010). In other words, there appears to be solid evidence in the liter-
ature that responding based on meanings enriched with scalar implicatures is more
costly than responding based on literal meaning. While presuppositions have been
studied much less than direct scalar implicatures, one common result of the stud-
ies conducted is that, unlike the case of scalar implicatures, verifying or deriving
presuppositions is not more costly than verifying or deriving the corresponding lit-
eral meaning, on the contrary, it appears to be less costly. Chemla and Bott 2013,
in particular, have found that sentence verification in contexts consistent with the
sentence’s presupposition was faster than in contexts inconsistent with it (i.e., in
situations only consistent with the sentence’s literal meaning).
Seeing the processing results for the two types of inferences in comparison, the
effects seem to go in opposite directions. In short, we could characterize this as fol-
lows: while the presence of direct scalar implicatures appears to be more costly than
their absence, for presuppositions it is their absence that appears more costly than
their presence. Schematically, the two main results from the processing of scalar
implicatures and that of presupposition are represented in (3).4
(3) a. Presence of direct scalar implicatures > Absence of direct scalar impli-
catures
b. Presence of presuppositions < Absence of presuppositions
The difference in processing between presuppositions provides a useful diagnos-
tic for evaluating the nature of other inferences (i.e., evaluating whether they are
more like presuppositions or more like scalar implicatures). This is because one can
investigate the processing profile of an inference and check where it stands with re-
spect to the distinction in (3) (i.e., presence-more-costly-than-absence vs. absence-
more-costly-than-presence).
In the experiment reported below, this is precisely what we have done. We have
investigated inferences exemplified by (4b), based on sentences such as (4a), against
the background of the distinction in (3). Following Chierchia (2004), we will label
these ‘indirect scalar implicatures’, in contrast to the previously considered cases,
which we will call ‘direct scalar implicatures.’
(4) a. John didn’t always go to the movies.
b. ↪→John sometimes went
4 Where A > B can be interpreted for now as A is associated with a higher processing cost than B.
For reaction times studies, which are the most relevant for us, A > B should be interpreted more
specifically as A gives rise to a longer reaction time than B.
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To our best knowledge, the processing of indirect scalar implicatures has not been
systematically investigated.5 However, this is an important gap to be filled as it could
tell us much about the relationship between them and direct scalar implicatures, on
the one hand, and presuppositions on the other. This is particularly relevant because
the inference in (4b) is generally regarded to be a scalar implicature of the very same
kind as (1b). Indeed, (1b) and (4b) appear to be very similar and symmetric - the
assertion in (1a) is the inference in (4) and, vice versa, the assertion in (4a) is the
inference that we derive from (1a). Descriptively speaking, direct scalar implicatures
arise from weak scalar terms in upward entailing contexts, while indirect scalar
implicatures emerge when strong scalar terms are embedded in downward entailing
ones.
While there are many different theories of scalar implicatures, what is important
for us here is that essentially all of them, as far as we know, agree that (1b) and (4b)
should be derived in the same way.6 Together with the fact mentioned above that
presuppositions like (2b) and scalar implicatures are considered to be different, we
could represent the traditional grouping of these three inferences as in (5).
(5) Traditional grouping
direct scalar implicatures = indirect scalar implicatures 6= presuppositions
It is clear that the picture in (5) makes two predictions. First, it predicts uniform
processing profiles for direct and indirect scalar implicatures.7 Second, it predicts
their processing and that of presuppositions to be different. In light of what we know
from the previous studies on direct scalar implicatures and presuppositions sketched
above, we thus expect that the presence of indirect scalar implicatures should be
associated with a higher cost than that of their absence, as with direct scalar impli-
catures, but in contrast with presuppositions. Schematically, these predictions can
be illustrated as follows:
(6) Predictions for indirect scalar implicatures:
a. presence of indirect scalar implicatures
> absence of indirect scalar implicatures
b. presence/absence of indirect scalar implicatures
6= presence/absence of presuppositions
5 But see Chemla 2009c for an offline study involving inferences of the type of (4a). For relevant
work on the acquisition of indirect scalar implicatures see Musolino and Lidz 2006 and Katsos
et al. 2011. Finally, after finishing this paper, the recent manuscript by Cremers and Chemla (2013)
came to our attention. We’ll have to leave a more detailed comparison with this work to another
occasion.
6 A possible exception is Chierchia 2004, in which direct and indirect scalar implicatures are
technically derived in slightly different ways. In this system, however, they are still both scalar
implicatures (and different from presuppositions). Therefore, it is not clear that this system has any
advantage in accounting for our results below.
7 A possible complication in this regard involves the presence of negation and its potential pro-
cessing implications. We will return to this briefly below.
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In this paper, we test the predictions in (6) by looking at the processing of indirect
scalar implicatures like (4b) in direct comparison with that of presuppositions and
against the background of the results in the literature on direct scalar implicatures.
As we will see in detail below, the results of our study challenges the prediction
for indirect scalar implicatures in (6) (and support the previous finding on presup-
positions in (3b)). We find the processing of indirect scalar implicatures to actually
be more similar to that of presuppositions than that of direct scalar implicatures.
Schematically, the main result of our experiment is represented in (7).
(7) Main results:
a. presence of indirect scalar implicatures
< absence of indirect scalar implicatures
b. presence/absence of indirect scalar implicatures
≈ presence/absence of presuppositions
In other words, at least from a processing point of view, the traditional grouping
in (5) appears incorrect. In the final part of the paper, we sketch two hypotheses
in response to this challenge: the first is that indirect scalar implicatures are actu-
ally presuppositions; the second is that they could be scalar implicatures, but of a
different kind than direct ones.
The paper is organized as follows: in section (2), we briefly introduce direct and
indirect scalar implicatures as well as presuppositions in more detail, and sketch
how they are traditionally derived. In section (3) we present our experiment and its
results. In section (4), we discuss the implications of the experimental findings and
explore two alternative ways of looking at indirect scalar implicatures in theoretical
terms in light of our results.
2 Background
2.1 Basic Properties of Implicatures and Presuppositions
Our example in (1), repeated below, provided a first illustration of direct scalar im-
plicatures. Descriptively speaking, inferences of this sort arise when a weak scalar
terms like sometimes appears in an upward entailing context. Further examples are
provided in (8) and (9), where the sentences in (8a) and (9a), which contain the
scalar terms some and or, respectively, give rise to the implicatures in (8b) and (9b).
(1) a. John sometimes went to the movies.
b. ↪→ John didn’t always go
(8) a. Some of the students went to the movies.
b. ↪→ Not all of them went
(9) a. John went to the movies or to the beach.
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b. ↪→ John didn’t go both to the movies and to the beach
Analogously, and in a symmetric fashion, indirect scalar implicatures arise from
strong scalar terms embedded in downward entailing environments. We already saw
the example in (4); other cases include (10) and (11), where the sentences (10a) and
(11a) containing the strong scalar terms all and and give rise to the implicatures in
(10b) and (11b).
(4) a. John didn’t always go to the movies.
b. ↪→ John sometimes went
(10) a. Not all of the students went to the movies.
b. ↪→ Some of the students did
(11) a. John didn’t both go to the movies and to the beach.
b. ↪→ John went to one or the other
One main characteristic of scalar implicatures is that they can easily be sus-
pended. More neutrally, we will say that they appear to be ‘absent’ in certain cases.
For instance, in (12a) and in (12b), the direct scalar implicature that John didn’t al-
ways go to the movies, for (12a), and the indirect one that John went sometimes to
the movies, for (12b), are not present (at least at the end of the continuations which
directly contradict them).
(12) a. John sometimes went to the movies. . .
In fact, he always did!
b. John didn’t always go to the movies. . .
In fact, he never went!
In brief, direct and indirect scalar implicatures are suspendable inferences of sen-
tences such as (1a) and (4a) and, at least superficially, they are symmetrical and
very similar. Indeed, as we will soon see in more detail, they have been treated in
a completely unified way. Before sketching the traditional way of deriving these
inferences, we turn to presuppositions in a bit more detail.
The example in (2), repeated below, provided a first illustration of a presuppo-
sitional inference. Other inferences of this sort include (13b and (14b), which are
associated with sentences like (13a) and (14a), containing an it-cleft and an achieve-
ment verb like win, respectively.
(2) a. John didn’t stop showing up late for class.
b. ↪→ John used to show up late for class
(13) a. It is John who showed up late for class.
b. ↪→ Somebody showed up late for class
(14) a. John didn’t win the marathon.
b. ↪→ John participated in the marathon
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The main characteristic property of presuppositions is their behavior in complex
sentences (Karttunen, 1973). This is their so-called ‘projection’ behavior, which can
be described as follows: if we consider a sentence like (13a) and we embed it under
negation (15a), in the antecedent of a conditional (15b), under a possibility modal
(15c) or in a question (15d), we still draw the inference in (13b). In traditional ter-
minology, the inference in (13b) ‘projects’ through the embeddings in (15a)-(15d).
This projection behavior is generally taken to be a characteristic feature of pre-
suppositions and it is used as a diagnostic for presuppositionality (Chierchia and
McConnell-Ginet, 1990; Beaver, 2001).
(15) a. It isn’t John who showed up late for class
b. If it is John who showed up late for class, he should apologize.
c. It’s possible that it is John who showed up late for class
d. Is it John who showed up late for class?
Similarly to scalar implicatures, we can easily construct cases in which presup-
positions appear to be suspended, or ‘absent,’ in the terminology we used above. In
(16), at least after hearing the continuation, we certainly do not conclude that the
presuppositional inference that John used to show up late for class is true.
(16) John didn’t stop showing up late. . .
because he never did!
As noticed above, this is not a property of all types of inferences. Compare,
for instance, the behavior of entailments, as exemplified by (17): the attempt of
suspending/contradicting the inference that John sometimes went to the movies, in
parallel to what was done above, sounds contradictory.
(17) John sometimes went to the movies last week. . .
#In fact he never went!
Summing up, presuppositions are inferences of sentences like (12a) that are not
strictly speaking obligatory, and which display a characteristic projection behavior
in complex sentences. The theoretical goals of a theory of presuppositions and of
scalar implicatures is to explain how these inferences arise and to predict precisely
in what circumstances they are arise. In the next section, we turn to sketch the tra-
ditional ways in which this is done.
2.1.1 Traditional Derivation of Implicatures and Presuppositions
In light of the theoretical goals just stated, we now proceed to briefly sketch what
could be described as the ‘traditional’ take on each of these inferences. This will be
a highly simplified and somewhat idealized description, not the least because many
of the theories that our description loosely encompasses are very different from each
other. Nonetheless, it will suffice for our purpose of illustrating something like the
standard theoretical treatment of these inferences.
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Starting with scalar implicatures, we can simply use an idealized Gricean algo-
rithm, as represented in (18) (Grice, 1975). As (18) indicates, the basic idea is that
when we hear an utterance, we reason about what the speaker might have said in-
stead (among a restricted set of competitors). We then conclude that some of these
competitors are false. More precisely, the competitors that we deem false are those
that are stronger than the speaker’s utterance.
(18) a. The speaker said A.
b. The speaker might have said B.
c. It’s false that B.
One question that arises at this point is how to determine competitors - that is
how do we determine B in (18). A simple response is the following: certain words
or morphemes, sometimes called ‘scalar terms,’ are associated with others in the
lexicon. For example, sometimes is associated with always, some with all, and or
with and.8 When we have a sentence containing one or more scalar terms, we can
obtain sentential alternatives by replacing the scalar terms in question with their
associates. For instance, if the assertion is (19a), we can obtain its sentential com-
petitor in (19b) by replacing sometimes with always. Once we have (19b), we can
apply our algorithm in (18) and derive the inference in (20).
(19) a. John sometimes went to the movies.
b. John always went to the movies.
(20) John didn’t always go to the movies.
While we are glossing over many details here, what is important for us is that the
very same ingredients that we used above for deriving the direct scalar implicature
in (20) can automatically account for indirect scalar implicatures like (21b) as well.
(21) a. John didn’t always go to the movies.
b. John sometimes went to the movies.
To illustrate, consider the assertion in (21a): we can obtain the competitor in (22)
by replacing sometimes with always.9 (22) is stronger than the assertion in (21a), and
therefore winds up being negated by the algorithm in (18). This yields the inference
that it’s not true that John didn’t sometimes go to the movies, which is equivalent to
(21b).
(22) John didn’t sometimes went to the movies.
8 See Horn 1972; Rooth 1992; Sauerland 2004 among many others. For a more articulate theory
of alternatives see Katzir 2007; Fox and Katzir 2011.
9 Notice that the positive polarity nature of sometimes makes (22), if asserted, marginal if not
completely infelicitous in its interpretation in which sometimes takes narrow scope with respect to
negation. As it is generally implicitly done in the literature, we will assume that this is not a feature
that applies to alternatives.
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In sum, on the traditional view - and essentially in all theories of scalar impli-
catures that we are aware of - direct and indirect scalar implicatures are derived in
the very same way. Before discussing how presuppositions are derived, let us sketch
how cases where the implicature winds up being absent can be derived, e.g., in cases
like (12a) and (12b), repeated from above.
(12a) John sometimes went to the movies. . .
In fact, he always went!
(12b) John didn’t always go to the movies. . .
In fact, he never went!
As already mentioned, on the traditional view implicatures arise as reasoning
about what the speaker could have said instead of what she actually said. This per-
spective can, therefore, easily account for the absence of scalar implicatures. This
is because if the speaker makes it clear, as in the continuation in (12a) and (12b)
above, that the competitor is true, then as hearers we will obviously not reason that
she must think it to be false.10
Turning our attention to the derivation of presuppositions, there are many dif-
ferent proposals in the literature on how to derive them, just as with in the case of
scalar implicatures. One approach, stemming from work by Stalnaker (1974, 1978),
Karttunen (1974), and Heim (1983), is to consider presuppositions as definedness
conditions on the ‘update’ of the context by the information associated with the as-
sertion. So for instance, a sentence like (23) can only update a context that already
entails the information that John used to show up late for class. If the context doesn’t
entail this information, either the sentence sounds infelicitous, or this information is
understood as an inference of the sentence.11
(23) John stopped showing up late for class.
Beyond basic cases such as (23), a theory of presuppositions needs to explain the
behavior of presuppositions in complex sentences as well. In the approach above, in
particular in Heim 1983, this is done by redefining the semantics of connectives and
quantifiers in such a way as to derive the projection properties of presuppositions.
In particular, this is done by identifying the meanings of sentences with the ways in
which they change the contexts they update (also called ‘context change potentials’).
Given its identification of the meanings of sentences with the way they change the
context they occur in, this approach is called ‘dynamic.’ It can be shown that this
way of proceeding ensures that not only is (23) predicted to presuppose that John
used to show up late for class, but also (24a)-(24d) are.
(24) a. John didn’t stop showing up late for class.
10 In other cases, other considerations enter into the picture, in particular a notion of ‘relevance’
is used, so that if it is clear in the context that the competitor would have not been relevant for the
goals of the conversation, the scalar implicature is not derived.
11 In this perspective, the presupposition is said to be ‘accommodated’ in the context (Lewis, 1979);
see von Fintel 2008; Beaver and Zeevat 2012 and references therein for further discussion.
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b. If John stopped showing up late for class, Mary will be pleased.
c. It’s possible that John stopped showing up late for class
d. Did John stop showing up late for class?
Many other theories of presuppositions have been proposed as well, of course,
from partial or trivalent logics to DRT-style approaches Kamp (1981), to more recent
pragmatic accounts (for a recent overview, see Schlenker, 2008). But what is most
important for our purposes is that these mechanisms are all different from those
assumed for deriving scalar implicatures.
As discussed in section 2.1, both implicature- and presupposition-based infer-
ences can be absent in certain circumstances. Given the different theoretical per-
spectives on the two types of inferences, the absence of presuppositions in cases
like (25) is generally derived in a way that’s very different from the way absent
inferences are derived in the case of scalar implicatures. Theoretically speaking,
presuppositions are generally seen as non-negotiable inferences (at least within the
accounts we’re considering here), and thus always have to be taken into account.
How can this, then, be reconciled with their apparent absence in cases like (25)?
The key idea is that presuppositions can be interpreted at different levels: when they
are computed globally, we expect an inference, but we do not if they are computed
in more local positions.
(25) John didn’t stop showing up late for class . . .
because he never did!
For instance, imagine - for the sake of presentation - that your favorite theory of
presuppositions is a function PS, which, given sentences of any complexity, returns
their presuppositions: for any p, PS(p) = p and p’s presuppositions. Imagine also
that PS can recursively be applied at any scope site of a sentence. For instance, for a
sentence like (26), repeated from above, we have two possible scope sites at which
PS could apply. First, it could apply at a global level, as in (27a) and this would give
rise to the inference that John used to show up late for class. Second, however, it
could also apply vacuously at a local level below negation, as in (27b). This latter
option is what corresponds to the ‘suspension’ or the ‘absence’ of presuppositions
in the traditional view, as this gives rise to an interpretation that is compatible with
John never having showed up late for class.
(26) John didn’t stop showing up late for class.
(27) a. PS[not[John stopped showing up late for class]]
b. not[PS[John stopped showing up late for class]]
In a case like (25), given that the continuation is incompatible with the global
derivation of the presupposition, it is assumed that the presupposition is instead
derived locally, as in (27b). In other words, in this approach the presence vs. absence
of presuppositions lines up with their global vs. local derivation.
This concludes our rough sketch of possible derivations of scalar implicatures
and presuppositions, as well as of accounts of cases where the respective inferences
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are absent. While there are many different alternative implementations, what is most
relevant here is that the on essentially all accounts, the stories are quite different for
implicatures and presuppositions. In the next section, we turn to a brief summary
of what has emerged from studies on the processing of direct scalar implicatures
and presuppositions in the literature and their implications for an investigation of
indirect scalar implicatures.
2.2 Processing Implicatures and Presuppositions
Among the three inferences that we are looking at in this paper, direct scalar impli-
catures are the ones that have been studied most extensively in the psycholinguistic
literature (Bott and Noveck, 2004; Bott et al., 2012; Breheny et al., 2006; Huang and
Snedeker, 2009; Chemla and Bott, 2013). A central result that has emerged from
these studies is that the processing of direct scalar implicatures appears to be costly.
More precisely, evaluating a sentence in a situation consistent with its direct scalar
implicature appears to be associated with a higher processing cost than evaluating it
in a situation incompatible with its direct scalar implicature (Bott and Noveck 2004;
Breheny et al. 2006; Huang and Snedeker 2009; but see Grodner et al. 2010). More
specifically, in reaction times studies, the reaction time associated with evaluating
a sentence in a situation compatible with its scalar implicature was consistently
longer than evaluating it in a situation only compatible with its literal meaning. We
can summarize this result as in (28) (Bott and Noveck 2004 among others).
(28) Result on direct scalar implicatures
presence of direct scalar implicatures > absence of direct scalar implicature
The processing of presuppositions has been studied less than direct scalar im-
plicatures, but the number of studies investigating it has been growing recently
(Chemla and Bott 2013; Schwarz 2007; Schwarz and Tiemann 2012, 2013). One
common result that has emerged from these recent studies is that, contrary to direct
scalar implicatures, it is the absence of presuppositions that gives rise to a higher
processing cost. In other words, evaluating a sentence in a situation compatible with
its presupposition is associated with a longer reaction time than evaluating it in a
situation incompatible with its presupposition.12 We can formulate this result as in
(29).
(29) Result on presuppositions
presence of presupposition < absence of presuppositions
As already mentioned, the processing of indirect scalar implicatures has not been
investigated in the literature. Given what we know from the studies just described
12 Notice that this does not mean that presuppositions per se are not associated with a cost. See
Schwarz and Tiemann 2013 for discussion and relevant results on the processing of presupposition
projection.
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and the unified treatment of direct and indirect scalar implicatures sketched above
and repeated in (30), we expect indirect scalar implicatures to behave like direct
ones in terms of processing. In other words, everything being equal we expect that
evaluating a sentence in a situation consistent with its indirect scalar implicature
should be slower than evaluating it in a situation which is inconsistent with its indi-
rect scalar implicature, (31).
(30) Traditional grouping:
direct scalar implicatures = indirect scalar implicatures 6= Presuppositions
(31) Prediction for Indirect scalar implicatures
Presence of indirect scalar implicatures > absence of indirect scalar impli-
catures
In the next section, we report on an experiment in which we tested the prediction
in (31). In particular, we tested (31) in direct comparison to the case of presuppo-
sitions and against the background of the results in the literature about direct scalar
implicatures.
3 Experiment: stop vs. not always in the Covered Box paradigm
In our experiment, we compared indirect scalar implicatures to presuppositions by
testing for the availability of different interpretations for strong scalar items and pre-
supposition triggers under negation using the covered box paradigm. This paradigm
is particularly well-suited for investigating the existence of non-dominant interpre-
tations and has already been fruitfully utilized in the study of implicatures (Huang
et al., 2013) and presuppositions in conditionals (Romoli et al., 2011). It is a vari-
ant of a picture-matching task, where participants have to judge the fit of a picture
with a given linguistic stimulus. The covered box version adds a layer to the ask by
including a (representation of) a covered box, which participants are told hides an-
other picture. In our variant, they are also told that only one of the pictures matches
the sentence. If they find none of the overtly shown pictures to match the sentence,
the match must be the hidden one and they should select the covered box. The
methodology is particularly useful for testing for the availability of non-dominant
interpretations, because participants are forced to consider whether an overtly shown
picture matching such an interpretation could possibly be seen as corresponding to
any available interpretation of the sentence in question. If they choose the covered
box instead, this is a clear indication that the relevant interpretation is not available
to them. Dominant interpretations can be included as well, of course, and we also in-
cluded controls to ensure that participants did indeed understand the task and choose
the covered box in cases where none of the overt pictures matched any interpretation
of the presented sentence.
Our implementation of this paradigm compared cases corresponding to overall
interpretations that either did or did not include an inference of interest. In the case
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of indirect scalar implicatures, this was the inference that some activity took place
some of the time when the sentence said that it did not always take place. In the case
of presuppositions, it was the global interpretation of the presupposition of stop
under negation that some activity had been going on prior to the time mentioned in
the sentence. The comparison cases involved no such inference, i.e., they involved
target pictures where the activity did not go on at all (in the case of indirect scalars)
or didn’t go on prior to the mentioned time (in the case of stop. Illustrations of the
actual stimuli used are introduced in the following subsection.
Based on the traditional picture sketched above, which assumes that indirect
scalar implicatures are equivalent to direct scalar implicatures in both their deriva-
tion and in processing, we’d expect response behavior results parallel to the well-
studied case of the latter. In particular, we’d expect that the generation of the scalar
inference comes with a processing cost that is reflected in an increase in (when com-
paring trials where the inference is drawn to ones where it is not), and possibly also
affects the frequency with which it is chosen as a match. With presuppositions, we
expect a different outcome, both based on the standard assumption in the theoretical
literature that global interpretations of presuppositions are the default and the ini-
tial processing results by Chemla and Bott (2013), where global interpretations are
argued to be faster than local ones. Based on these expectations, we thus predict a
cross-over interaction, with slower for inference trials with always and faster ones
for inference trials with stop.
3.1 Materials & Design
Our materials utilized pictures depicting individuals together with a 5-day calendar
strip that contained icons representing various activities or destinations. Subjects
were told that these represented what the individuals did during the past week, and
they had to identify which of them match the provided linguistic description (see
below for procedural details). The critical manipulation varied whether the target
picture corresponded to an interpretation that included the inference of interest or
not. Illustrations are provided in (32):
(32) a. Benjamin didn’t always go to the movies last week.
↪→ Benjamin sometimes went to the movies last week
i. Inference ii. No Inference
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b. Benjamin didn’t stop going to the movies on Wednesday
↪→ Benjamin went to the movies prior to Wednesday
i. Inference ii. No Inference
The inference target picture in the always-condition matched the inference at stake
for the sentence in (32a), as this person did go to the movies some but not all of the
time. The no-inference picture, on the other hand, does not match this inference and
thus should only be selected if the inference is not present. Similarly, the inference
stop-picture matches the inference in that this person did go to the movies prior to
Wednesday (and continued to do so from then on, to match the asserted content
as well). But the no-inference picture did not match the inference, as this person
did not go to the movies prior to Wednesday. Note that the asserted content - that
they did go to the movies from Wednesday on - is still matched by the no-inference
picture, so that the participants’ decision about whether this picture matches the
sentence is a clear indicator of whether or not the inference based on the global
presupposition is present or not. Note furthermore that under a local interpretation
of the presupposition, this picture does match the sentence, as the negation of the
conjunction Benjamin went to the movies before Wednesday and he went to the
movies on Wednesday and thereafter is indeed true of it.
In addition to the target and the covered box, a third distractor item was included
as well. Distractors included a picture of another individual and were constructed so
as not to match either interpretation of the respective sentences (e.g., the distractor
for the always-conditions had a boy that went to the movies every day, and the
one for the stop-condition had a boy that went to the beach from Monday through
Thursday and to the movies on Friday).
A total of 12 items were created with variants in all four conditions described
above. Furthermore, an additional experimental manipulation involving the inter-
pretation of the verb think under negation was included, which we will not discuss
here in detail for reasons of space. In brief, a sentence such as Benjamin doesn’t
think he will go to the movies on Thursday can, but does not necessarily, give rise to
the inference that Benjamin is certain that he won’t go to the movies on Thursday.
We varied pictures here by either including another activity on Thursday or plac-
ing a question mark there. Given the future-orientedness of these stimuli, they were
presented in a separate block of the experiment where participants were told that
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the calendar strips represented the corresponding individuals’ plans for the coming
week. Order of blocks was counter-balanced between participants.13
In addition to the experimental stimuli, several types of filler items without nega-
tion were included. First, there was a set of 12 items with sentences containing stop
without negation. For half of these, the target picture matched the sentence, and for
the other half it did not and thus required selection of the covered box. Similarly,
there were 12 items using always without negation, again split in half with respect
to whether or not the target matched the sentence. In the block on think, parallel
control variants without negation were included.
3.2 Procedure & Participants
After signing a consent form, participants were seated in front of a computer,
where the experimental program prepared in SR Research’s Experiment Builder
was started. They were then shown instructions that told them that they were taking
on the role of a detective in a guessing game, where they would see three pictures,
one of them blocked from view, and a sentence, which was a piece of intercepted
communication from a suspect about their activities during a certain week. Based
on that intercepted information, they were to decide who was the suspect, under the
assumption that only one of the three pictures was compatible with the sentence,
and that the covered box would therefore need to be chosen if neither one of the
overt pictures matched the sentence. The choice was carried out by using a mouse
to click on the selected picture. Prior to displaying the images and the sentence, a
fixation cross was presented in the center of the screen for 1000ms.
After the instructions, the first block started with two practice trials to familiarize
them with the task. One block consistent of the stop and not always items and fillers,
and the other of the think items. Each block had its own practice trials, as they
differed in that one was about the past week and the other about the upcoming one.
The expression factor was used as a within subject factor, i.e., participants saw
three out of the six variations of each item, one with each expression (stop, not
always, think). Whenever they saw the stop version of an item in the inference con-
dition, they saw they always version in the no-inference condition and vice versa.
Each subject completed a total of 36 experimental trials, (24 and 12 in the respective
blocks), as well as 36 filler trials (again 24 and 12 in the different blocks).
25 undergraduate students from the University of Pennsylvania, all native speak-
ers of English, participated in the experiment for course credit. They were randomly
assigned to 4 groups for counterbalancing both the inference vs. no-inference con-
ditions and the block order. Each subject saw 6 items in each condition.
13 For those curious about the results, we found no differences between inference and no-inference
trials for this sentence type, in contrast with the other two, as discussed below. We have to leave
the interpretation of this result for another occasion.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Data Treatment
For purposes of analysis, responses were coded with respect to whether participants
selected the target picture or the covered box. Trials where the distractor was chosen
were considered as errors and were removed (2.5% of trials fell into this category,
leaving 585 out of 600 data points for analysis). Reaction times were calculated as
the time that passed from initial display of the images and the sentence until the
mouse click occurred.
3.3.2 Statistical Analysis
The average proportions of target choices by condition is depicted in Figure 1. As
can be seen from the graph, target choices were much less frequent in the No In-
ference condition, both for stop and always: While the Inference conditions were
at ceiling with close to 100% target choices, there were only around 27% (always)
and 29% (stop) of trials with target choices. Note that there also was a rather strik-
ing divide between participants with slightly over half of them (14) never making
any target choices in the No Inference condition, and slightly less then half of them
(11) making target choices around two thirds of the time (for both stop and always).
Furthermore, inspecting target choices relative to trial order, it appeared to be the
case for most of the participants belonging to the latter group that they did not ini-
tially select the target on No Inference trials, but then switched and stuck with target
choices from then on. There were two participants which only had target choices for
stop in the No Inference condition, and one that only had target choices for always
in that condition. All others had target choices for both expressions.
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To analyze the pattern in responses statistically, we carried out mixed effect
model logistic regression analyses using the lmer package in R (Bates, 2005). While
we tried to include random slopes for both factors and their interaction, follow-
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ing the recommendation of Barr et al. (2013), the corresponding models did not
converge, and we thus only included random intercepts (for both participants and
items). We report estimates, standard errors, z-values, and p-values from the lmer
output. A 2×2 interaction analysis (stop vs. always and Inference vs. No Infer-
ence) using centered factors yielded a main effect of the Inference factor (β = 6.73,
SE = 0.62, z = 10.8, p < .001). There was no main effect of expression and no sig-
nificant interaction, but the effect of the Inference manipulation was slightly more
pronounced in the always conditions in numerical terms. Planned comparisons for
the effect of the Inference factor within each type of expression were carried out by
using the appropriate treatment coding. There was a simple effect of the Inference
factor for both stop (β = 5.90, SE = 0.61, z = 9.66, p< .001) and always (β = 7.53,
SE = 0.95, z = 7.91, p < .001).14
In summary, targets were selected much less frequently in the No Inference con-
dition. For the indirect scalar implicature with not always, this is somewhat surpris-
ing given previous results for direct implicatures. Using essentially the same task,
involving picture selection with a covered box, Huang et al. (2013) found 87% target
choices in the equivalent of a No Inference (≈ literal) condition with the quantifier
some. Furthermore, several studies conducted in our lab using a truth-value judg-
ment task rendered similarly high acceptance rates in (the equivalent of) No Infer-
ence conditions. For presuppositions, there is much less precedent, though Chemla
and Bott (2013) found about 50% of (the equivalent of) No Inference responses in
a truth-value judgment task with factive verbs such as realize and know. Looking at
both expressions together, what stands out that they seem to behave quite similarly
as far as participants’ response behavior is concerned, even though we traditionally
would not group them together, as discussed above.
Turning to reaction times, we again find similar patterns of results for the two
expressions we investigated. The mean for target choices in the Inference and No In-
ference conditions are graphed in Figure 2. For both always and stop, target choices
in the No Inference conditions were slower than in the Inference conditions. To eval-
uate these differences statistically, we ran mixed effect model analyses, again using
the lmer function in R. Statistical analyses used mixed-effect models with partici-
pants and items as random effects, using the lmer function of the lme4 package in
R Bates (2005). Following Barr et al. (2013), the maximal random effect structure
that was suitable for the design and that would converge was used, with a random
intercept as well as random slopes. To assess whether inclusion of a given factor
significantly improved the fit of the overall model, likelihood-ratio tests were per-
formed that compared two minimally different models, one with the fixed effects
factor in question and one without, while keeping the random effects structure iden-
tical (Barr et al., 2013). We report estimates, standard errors, and t-values for all
models, as well as the χ2 and p-value from the likelihood-ratio test for individual
factors.
A 2×2 interaction analysis, with random intercepts and random slopes for type
of expression for participants and items and a random slope for the Inference fac-
14 These effects were also present when looking only at data from the participants with target
choices in the No Inference condition.
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tor for items, yielded significant a main effect of Inference (β = 1517, SE = 437,
t = 3.47; χ2 = 7.73, p < .01), with slower in the No Inference condition. There
also was a main effect of expression (RES-2124: β = 558, SE = 3.81, t = 11.40;
χ2 = .001, p <,) with slower for stop, but no significant interaction. The main effect
of expression includes reading times for the sentence, and thus may at least in part
be due to differences in sentence structure. Planned comparisons between the Infer-
ence and No Inference conditions for stop and always suggest that the difference is
present for both expressions, reaching significance for stop (β = 2110, SE = 619,
t = 3.41; χ2 = 4.16, p < .05), and approaching it for always (β = 948, SE = 618,
t = 1.53; χ2 = 2.37, p < .13).15 Taken together, the upshot of the reaction time
results is that target choices in the No Inference condition are slower than in the
Inference condition.
Given the split in participants with respect to whether or not they had any target
choices in the No Inference condition at all, we conducted some post-hoc analyses
as well to further investigate differences between these groups. The No Inference
participants seemed to exhibit slower overall. Comparing for covered box choices
in the local conditions revealed a significant difference between them and the group
without any target choices in the No Inference condition (β = 4365, SE = 1637,
t = 2.67; χ2 = 6.70, p < .01). Similarly, target choices in the global conditions
were marginally slower for them as well (RES-1162: β = 659, SE = 1.76, t = 3.09;
χ2 = .1, p < .)
There are some interesting methodological points to note as well, concerning the
use of the covered box design for investigating response times. Note that the central
comparisons of interest above are all comparisons between equivalent choices, all
involving trials where the target picture was chosen. This allows for a more straight-
forward comparison between different interpretations, as it avoids issues such as the
well-known response bias effect, which commonly yields slower response times for
false answers in truth-value judgment tasks. Interestingly, covered box choices were
not significantly slower than target choices (looking at the local conditions for the
15 As with the response data, largely parallel results are also obtained when just looking at the data
from participants with target choices in the No Inference condition.
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No Inference participants). Another interesting point to note in this regard is that
comparing target vs. covered box choices for the No Inference participants yields
a rather different pattern from the results discussed above. While the No Inference
responses were slower than the Inference responses, rejections of the target picture
in the No Inference conditions was even slower than their acceptance (though only
numerically). A result along these lines alone might have suggested a very different
line of interpretation, though it might face some of the same issues as existing reac-
tion time studies (e.g., with respect to response bias). Of further interest is the fact
that covered box choices of those participants that never had any target choices in
the No Inference condition were (numerically) faster even than the target choices of
the participants from the other group. While we cannot pursue these issues in fur-
ther detail here for reasons of space, these methodological points seem well worth
investigating in greater depth, and we are currently extending the paradigm to direct
scalar implicatures as well.
4 Discussion
We saw above how direct and indirect scalar implicatures are typically considered
part of the same phenomenon and different from presuppositions. Our results chal-
lenge this standard picture. In particular, we found that the proportion of No in-
ference choices with the strong scalar term always was much lower than in other
studies investigating direct scalar implicatures as arising from weak scalar terms
like some (Huang et al. 2013 in particular). More importantly, the reaction time
associated with the No inference choice was slower than that associated with the In-
ference choice, not only with stop but also with always, in contrast with findings in
the literature for direct scalar implicatures. The result for stop is consistent with pre-
vious findings (Chemla and Bott, 2013), while that associated with always is a novel
result. The most informative part of the results, however, is the direct comparison
between the two inferences.
To illustrate the implication of our results more schematically, recall that the tra-
ditional grouping of these inferences is that sketched in (5). Given what we know
about the processing of direct scalar implicatures and that of presuppositions, the
prediction of the traditional approach was that the presence of indirect scalar impli-
catures should give rise to a longer response time than its absence.
(5) Traditional grouping
direct scalar implicatures = indirect scalar implicatures 6= presuppositions
(6) Predictions for indirect scalar implicatures:
a. presence of indirect scalar implicatures
> absence of indirect scalar implicatures
b. presence/absence of indirect scalar implicatures
6= presence/absence of presuppositions
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Our results thus do not support the prediction in (6): the processing of indirect
scalar implicatures appears more similar to that of presuppositions than that of direct
scalar implicatures. In other words, the reaction time associated with the presence
of indirect scalar implicatures was shorter than that associated with their absence.
(7) Main results:
a. presence of indirect scalar implicatures
< absence of indirect scalar implicatures
b. presence/absence of indirect scalar implicatures
≈ presence/absence of presuppositions
The outcome in (7) is a challenge for the traditional view, and in the next section
we briefly consider two responses that we are exploring in light of this challenge.
Before doing so, let us briefly touch on two relevant points. First, let us emphasize
that at this point we did not test direct scalar implicatures in our design. Therefore
our discussion below relies on previous results in the literature. While the method-
ologies of other response time studies are comparable to ours, we are currently in
the process of testing direct scalar implicatures in a within-subject experiment with
direct ones. Until then, our discussion relies on the assumption that direct scalar
implicatures will give rise to a delay in the same way they did in previous stud-
ies. Secondly, we want to discuss the relevance of our results for some more recent
accounts of presuppositions that treat them more like indirect scalar implicatures
(Chemla 2009a; Romoli 2012, Romoli (to appear); see also Simons 2001; Abusch
2010). In these approaches, (at least some) presuppositions are essentially consid-
ered to be indirect scalar implicatures. This can in principle account very well for the
similarity in processing that we found. However, there are two issues that are also
not straightforwardly solved in these approaches. First, as we will see below, there
are other differences between indirect scalar implicatures and presuppositions that
need to be accounted for. Once these differences are explained in these recent ap-
proaches, however, it is not clear that the similarity in processing is still expected.16
Secondly, these accounts still propose that direct and indirect scalar implicatures
should be handled in a unified way and this appears problematic given our results.
In sum, the results presented above are challenging for a traditional view of in-
direct scalar implicatures, and they are also not straightforwardly accounted for in
more recent approaches treating presuppositions and indirect scalar implicatures in a
more or less parallel way. In the next section, we turn to two hypotheses in response
to this challenge.
16 For instance, Romoli (2012), Romoli (to appear) proposes that some presuppositions are obliga-
tory indirect scalar implicatures and this can account for certain differences with ‘regular’ indirect
scalar implicatures. But then, once we distinguish between presuppositions and indirect scalar im-
plicatures in this way, it is not clear anymore that the similarity in processing is expected.
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4.1 Presuppositions or Obligatory Implicatures?
Our results challenge the idea that indirect scalar implicatures are simply regular
scalar implicatures, because they appear to have different processing profiles. What
could indirect scalar implicature be then if not simply regular scalar implicatures?
We explore two hypotheses. First, we focus on the idea that indirect scalar impli-
catures could actually be presuppositions.17 Second, we consider a different option,
one that takes indirect scalar implicatures to be a different type of scalar implicature.
4.1.1 Indirect scalar implicatures as presuppositions
The first hypothesis could be formulated as in (33). According to (33), a sentence
like (34a) not only entails but also presupposes, in the traditional sense, its sentential
alternative (34b).
(33) Indirect scalar implicatures as presuppositions:
strong scalar terms presuppose their weakest competitor.18
(34) a. John always went to the movies.
b. John sometimes went to the movies.
Now, of course, if (34a) presupposes (34b), it follows from any mechanism for
deriving presupposition projection, that (34b) is also a presupposition of (35).
(35) John didn’t always go to the movies.
Moreover, if (34b) is a presuppositions of sentences like (34a) or (35), then it is
indeed expected that its processing should be similar to that of presuppositions such
as that associated with stop. The hypothesis in (33) can, therefore, account for our
processing results.
There are, however, several issues with the hypothesis in (33) that remain open
at this point. These issues are related to (at least potential) differences between pre-
suppositions and indirect scalar implicatures. In particular, in relation to the pro-
jection behavior of presuppositions, e.g., in the context of connectives, modals and
questions, as well as to the persistence of the projection of the inference in quantifi-
cational environments.
Starting with the first point concerning connectives, modals, and questions, we
saw above that we want our theory of presuppositions to predict that all of (36a)-
(36e) should give rise to the inference that somebody showed up late for class.
(36) a. It is John who showed up late for class
17 Thanks to Danny Fox (p.c.) for suggesting this way of looking at indirect scalar implicatures.
18 We only consider here the weakest competitor as a presupposition. This immediately raises the
question as to whether also other intermediate members of the scale, like ‘often’ in this case, should
be considered presuppositions. We leave this issue for future research.
22 Romoli & Schwarz
b. It isn’t John who showed up late for class
c. It’s possible that it is John who showed up late for class
d. Is it John who showed up late for class?
e. If it is John who showed up late for class, he should apologize.
If indirect scalar implicatures are presuppositions, we expect the same projec-
tion behavior. In other words, we expect all of (37a)-(37e) to presuppose that John
sometimes went to the movies.
(37) a. John always went to the movies.
b. John didn’t always go to the movies.
c. It’s possible that John always went to the movies.
d. Did John always go to the movie?
e. If John always went to the movies, he will be able to suggest a good
movie.
Based on our own intuitions, it is not clear that the inference that John sometimes
went to the movies from (37b)-(37e) is as robust as the one that someone showed up
late for class arising from (36b) to (36e), or even whether it is present at all. Such
intuitions are rather subtle, however, so a more systematic investigation is needed to
establish this data point.
Another relevant case, investigated by Chemla (2009a), is that of negative quan-
tifiers like (38a) and (39a). When presented with a sentence like (38a) and asked
whether the universal inference in (38c) followed, the participants of the experi-
ments by Chemla (2009a) were largely willing to give an affirmative answer.
(38) a. None of these ten students won the marathon.
b. Some of these ten students participated in the marathon.
c. Each of these ten students participated in the marathon.
More precisely, the inference in (38c) was accepted more often (≈ 80%) than
the analogous universal inference with a scalar implicature in (39c) from (39a) (≈
25%).
(39) a. None of my professors failed all of their students.
b. Some of my professors failed some of their students.
c. All of my professors failed some of their students.
This result tells us that in the scope of negative quantifiers there is a difference
in the degree to which presuppositional triggers and strong scalar terms give rise to
universal inferences.19 And this difference is unexpected based on the hypothesis in
(33) above, which treats indirect scalar implicatures and presuppositions uniformly.
19 Notice that, importantly, these results by no means imply that sentences like (39a) do not give
rise at all to universal inferences like that in (39c). See Romoli 2012, Romoli (to appear) for
arguments in favor of the existence of tg inference.
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Finally, the hypothesis in (33) does not say anything about whether the infer-
ences that we have labeled indirect scalar implicatures arise only because they are
presuppositions, or whether the same inference is additionally supported by stan-
dard implicature reasoning. In fact, for most theories of scalar implicatures, it seems
hard to even block deriving them as scalar implicatures as well, based on an account
of direct ones in terms of reasoning about scalar alternatives in terms of logical
strength. If indirect scalar implicatures are derived both based on scalar reasoning
and because they are presupposed, this raises obvious questions about how these
two components interact. We have to leave the exploration of these open issues for
a future occasion.
4.1.2 Indirect scalar implicatures as obligatory scalar implicatures
Another idea possibility to explore in order to account for our results is that indirect
scalar implicatures could be a type of scalar implicatures distinct from direct ones,
with corresponding differences in their processing properties. In particular, we focus
on the notion of ‘obligatory’ scalar implicatures, recently proposed by Spector 2007;
Chierchia et al. 2012. This second hypothesis can be formulated as in (40).
(40) Indirect scalar implicatures as obligatory scalar implicatures:
Indirect scalar implicatures are obligatory.
The obligatoriness in (40) can be implemented in different ways and we will re-
main neutral on how this should be done. What is relevant for us is that if indirect
scalar implicatures are obligatory scalar implicatures, we can account for our results
about their processing in the following way. First, consider how we would explain
cases in which indirect scalar implicatures are absent in this approach. This is not
straightforward, because if they are obligatory, we cannot simply say that they are
not derived in the first place, based on contextual information about the speaker’s
beliefs. However, in the same way as what we described is standardly done for pre-
suppositions, we can resort to a local derivation of scalar implicatures. To illustrate,
imagine your theory of scalar implicatures to be a function SI, which applied to a
sentence returns its meaning strengthened with a scalar implicature. For instance,
for any p, SI(p) = p and p’s scalar implicatures. Moreover, imagine that SI can be
recursively applied at any scope site of a complex sentence. If you have a sentence
like (41), repeated from above, there are at least two scope sites at which you can
apply your SI. First, you can apply it globally, as in (42a), which gives rise to the in-
direct scalar implicature that John sometimes went to the movies. Second, however,
you could apply it locally, under the scope negation (42b). This local derivation is
vacuous, therefore this is equivalent to the absence of the indirect scalar implica-
tures (i.e., in this interpretation, (41) is compatible with a situation in which John
never went to the movies).
(41) John didn’t always go to the movies.
(42) a. SI[not[John always went to the movies]]
24 Romoli & Schwarz
b. not[SI[John always went to the movies]]
In sum, if we take this approach, we can account for the cases in which indirect
scalar implicatures are suspended as cases of (vacuous) local scalar implicatures.
Having local interpretations available is useful independently. We know from the
literature that the distribution of scalar implicatures generally appears to be sensi-
tive to the polarity of the context in which the scalar term is embedded. In other
words, scalar implicatures tend not to arise when the corresponding scalar term is
embedded in downward entailing contexts.20 However, it is possible to force the
strengthened interpretation of a scalar term in a downward entailing context, though
such an interpretation appears to be marked. For instance, one way to account for
how (44) is compatible with its continuation is to assume that it should be inter-
preted with a local scalar implicature under negation, as in (45). This interpretation
could be paraphrased as either John met neither Paul nor Mary or he met both of
them and it is, therefore, compatible with the continuation that he met both of them.
(44) John didn’t meet Paul or Mary ...
he met both of them!
(45) not[SI[John met Paul or Mary]]
Now, if we make the plausible assumption that the intuitive markedness of local
scalar implicatures in downward entailing contexts is reflected in processing and
assume that our No Inference condition involves precisely that, we can account for
the processing cost associated with that condition. This is because, on this approach,
the only way the participants of our experiment could chose a picture incompatible
with the indirect scalar implicature for a case like (46) is if they computed it locally
under negation. The observed markedness plausibly can be seen as corresponding
to the observed delay in processing.
(46) John didn’t always go to the movies.
In light of the differences between indirect scalar implicatures and presuppo-
sitions discussed above, which are potentially problematic for an account of the
former in terms of the latter, it is worth considering how the present hypothesis
fares in this regard. Given that this hypothesis does not assume that indirect scalar
implicatures are presuppositions, it could, in principle, explain the differences with
presuppositions better. To illustrate, consider first the case of connectives, modals,
and questions. Here we do not predict the same projection pattern for both types of
20 To illustrate, consider the following minimal pair from Chierchia (in press): while (43a) is easily
interpreted with an exclusive reading of disjunction (i.e., everyone likes Mary or Sue but not both),
this is not the case for (43b). In other words, (43b) is generally interpreted as not suggesting that
if someone likes both Mary and Sue, she won’t write to the dean (see Panizza et al. 2009 for
discussion and experimental data that show the sensitivity of scalar implicatures to polarity).
(43) a. Everyone either likes Mary or likes Sue and will write to the dean.
b. Everyone who either likes Mary or likes Sue will write to the dean.
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inferences.21 For illustration, take the case of possibility modals and the antecedent
of conditionals. In the former case, the alternative that we obtain in (47b) for (47a)
is entailed by the assertion so no inference is predicted - specifically the inference
that John sometimes went to the movies is not predicted.
(47) a. It’s possible that John always went to the movies.
b. It’s possible that John sometimes went to the movies.
Similarly, in the case of antecedents of conditionals, the alternative that we have
for (48a) is (48b), which is stronger than the assertion, so it winds up being negated.
The inference that we obtain, however - it’s false that if John sometimes went to
the movies, he skipped the cooking classes - is not the projection-like inference that
a theory of presuppositions would obtain (namely that John sometimes went to the
movies).
(48) a. If John always went to the movies, he skipped the cooking classes.
b. If John sometimes went to the movies, he skipped the cooking classes.
As far as the difference between universal and negative quantifiers in (49b) and
(50b) is concerned, while (50b) might as well be an inference of (50a), given that
in this approach presuppositions and indirect scalar implicatures are different in
nature, it is not expected that the rate of acceptance of (50b) should be the same
as that of (49b).22 In other words, this approach is compatible with the results by
Chemla (2009a).
(49) a. None of these students stopped showing up late for class.
b. All of these students used to show up late for class.
(50) a. None of these students did all of the readings .
b. All of these students did some of the readings.
In sum, we have sketched two alternative theoretical perspectives on indirect
scalar implicatures that differentiate them from direct ones, and discussed how this
could account for our results. At this point both hypotheses require fleshing out and
further exploration, but we have to leave a more detailed investigation for future
research. Relatedly, we note that, as part of the general project of comparing direct
and indirect scalar implicatures and presuppositions, we are currently investigating
the case of always under negation in direct within-participants comparison with
that of sometimes in positive sentences. Additionally, we are also in the process of
comparing children’s knowledge of direct and indirect scalar implicatures, as well as
presuppositions, to provide yet another angle on the comparison of these inferences.
We hope that taken together, this series of studies will provide the basis for a more
comprehensive understanding of the types of inferences discussed here.
21 We do not predict projection inferences, unless we make additional assumptions. See Chemla
2009a; Romoli 2012, Romoli (to appear) for scalar implicature-based account of presuppositions,
which do make additional assumptions for deriving their projection behavior.
22 See Romoli 2012 Romoli (to appear) for arguments in favor of having the inference in (50b)
from (50a) and a proposal on how to derive it as a scalar implicature,
26 Romoli & Schwarz
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